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AN AIRLINE PILOT'S VIEW OF SAFETY
By ROBERT N. BucKt
I. WHAT PILOTS DO ABOUT SAFETY
T HE BASIC FACTOR controlling air safety is economy. There are
two extremes. One is to make flying so safe that the airline cannot
make a profit; the other is to fly for maximum profit disregarding safety.
The total safety effort is to find some point between these extremes
where the risks and profits are acceptable. The airline pilot's role is to
maintain this in between point, leaning toward safety. The pilot is not
always a popular person as he pursues this, but it should be remembered
that he has a most objective outlook on safety. His primary interest is to
protect the lives of passengers and himself, not to protect a product or
bureau. The pilot is personally affected by an accident. An accident to
him is not simply a statistic or formal report; it is a tragedy of human
suffering which he sees at first hand with full impact-a tragedy which
he may be blamed for and blamed unjustly. How does the airline pilot
try to improve air safety? He does it largely through his union, the Air
Line Pilots Association (hereinafter ALPA).
ALPA spends considerable funds, time and effort on air safety. It
supports an Engineering and Air Safety department which employs full
time aeronautical engineers. The major work, however, is done by the
pilots. Each local council of an airline has an Air Safety Chairman, each
airline a Central Safety Chairman and each region a Regional Air Safety
Committee. All these efforts are coordinated with the head office engineers.
More than 200 people are involved.
The pilots watchdog their airlines on day-to-day safety matters that
cover a wide range including maintenance, operational procedures, train-
ing, new equipment, and instrumentation. In the event of an accident,
pilots of the safety group take part in the accident investigation by work-
ing closely with government agencies at the scene of the accident. They
also attend the official accident hearings. In 1966 ALPA investigated 27
major accidents plus innumerable incidents.
ALPA has a large group of standing committees also made up of pilots
with the engineering staff available for technical help. These committees
cover a wide field, some of them being:
(1) air traffic control,
(2) all weather flying,
(3) pilot training,
(4) airworthiness and performance,
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(5) noise abatement,
(6) new aircraft evaluation, and
(7) airport survey and improvement.
In addition, ALPA members maintain extensive contacts with FAA, CAB,
NASA, ESSNA and the military, as well as, technical organizations such
as SAE, RTCA, and AIAA. Further, ALPA works closely with inter-
national organizations and governments. ALPA annually conducts a safety
forum which analyzes committee work, discusses safety problems and
gives the pilot an opportunity to exchange viewpoints with industry and
government representatives who are invited to attend. The safety forum
is of worldwide interest and reputation.
The pilots doing this work do not receive remuneration except to be
reimbursed by ALPA for expenses and any pay loss they may incur by
missing a flight. Much of the work is done on spare time. Within this
pilot group there is considerable background, and many of the pilots
doing safety work are aeronautical engineers, lawyers, psychologists and
other professionals.
The airline pilot through his union has been accepted by industry and
government, and his opinions are valued and sought. For instance, some
pilot committees are active with government and industry trying to make
all weather flying a safe reality; others work on the same basis evaluating
new aircraft designs such as the Boeing 747 and the SST. The pilots' hope
is that they may help create a better, safer airplane before it enters airline
service and not find themselves living with a bad design after that airplane
is in service. Pilots have been a part of the creation of approach lights,
runway markings, runway length requirements, crash worthiness rules,
training rules, the SST nose configuration for better visibility, the basic
T instrument arrangement, fire after crash tests with NASA and United
Air Lines, shoulder harness requirement, reverse thrust as an added safety
factor in landing and not a crutch for shortening landing distances, lower
weather minimums, Doppler navigation, floating seat cushions and many
others. These are some of the things the airline pilot does about safety and
how he does them, but now let us talk about some of the problems and
things he would like to see improved.
II. PROBLEMS AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS
A. The Airport
Many airports have inadequate runways, particularly under bad weather
conditions. On paper these runways are adequate; under actual conditions
they are not. Turbulence during an approach plus anticipated wind sheer
means extra airspeed to any competent pilot. This uses up runway, and
he knows it; but he is using judgment based on experience and knowledge
that may be contrary to the exact figure written in a manual which was
developed from tests made under ideal conditions on a sunny morning in
calm air with a well rested and practiced test pilot at the controls.
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The basic reason for wanting added runway length is the difficulty in
stopping on wet or icy surfaces. One of the most startling experiences a
pilot may have is to apply brakes on a jet transport as he rolls down a wet
runway and find that the airplane just is not stopping. It is the same
helpless feeling one has on ice in an automobile in a skid. During these
trying periods of slick landings we do not have any measurement telling
us what to expect in the way of runway braking coefficient when we land.
The same problems makes V1, the go-no-go speed of takeoff, a theoretical
and impractical number that is valid only on paper or a clean, dry runway.
The obvious solution to short runways is to make them longer, but this
is difficult economically and socially. Another way is to make airplanes
land slower. It is to the credit of some manufacturers that new model jets
land slower than previous ones; the Boeing 707 series is an excellent ex-
ample. But this is not always the case-landing speeds of some new air-
planes are shockingly high. The future promises more of the same, and I
speak specifically of the supersonic Concorde.
The pilots' fears of high landing speeds are based on experience as they
live with fast landing airplanes that are made to "fit" short runways by
gimmickry and procedures written in manuals. The pilots have been
successful in getting some runway length increase, but these are not
sufficient with todays aircraft, particularly with lower weather minimums
coming into use.
Other problems cause the airport to be a place of hazard. Constant con-
struction of taxiways and buildings makes taxiing an airplane something
like running a gauntlet. At night, with confusing and inadequate lighting,
taxiing an aircraft within a few feet of a three foot drop off in pavement
is frightening because slipping into this ditch could cause a structural fail-
ure, leaking fuel and fire.
The ground based vehicles on airports which service fuel, food, mainten-
ance, and baggage have become a multitude. Familiarity again breeds con-
tempt as the vehicle driver zips closer and closer to the airplane. I had a
commisary truck attempt to bluff me or play "chicken" as I taxied a
707 toward a gate at Kennedy. The truck won the contest as I stopped to
allow him passage.
It is of considerable concern to know that most airport fire fighting
equipment is off in some distant corner far from the action and that
precious time will pass in the event of an accident before the equipment
can be on the scene. It seems basic that fire and rescue equipment should
be adjacent to the active runway read to save decisive seconds should an
accident occur.
B. Air Traffic
We need a collision avoidance device as soon as possible. The effort being
put on its development is not strong enough. The device is needed because
traffic control is not infallible, mistakes are made, and the magic of radar
does not take care of all conditions. Any airline pilot can tell you of
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times radar did not see an airplane that passed close by. The need for colli-
sion avoidance equipment is obvious, and its creation should be a priority
item. No matter how stringent and restrictive the rules may be, or how
good radar and computer technology become, an anti-collision device
will be a necessity.
Air Traffic Control's primary job is to keep airplanes from running
into each other, but its job is to move traffic quickly, too. At first this last
point may seem an economic requirement only, but it is a safety re-
quirement also. One of the key hazards in air traffic control is trying to
move traffic faster than the system will allow. This is the time controllers
are pressured into fast, furious and error-susceptible action. It means
jaming airplanes too close together with one still on the runway as the
next one is about to land. It means fast radio chatter with repeats of in-
structions being overlooked and misunderstood. Traffic will not be at its
safest until the traffic flow presented to the system can be absorbed expe-
ditiously. The largest single requirement to make this possible is more run-
way space. If a runway can accept 40 airplanes an hour and 50 arrive
it is obvious that traffic will back up and dangers will increase. Better
airports, more runways and more airports are an important part of safety.
It is possible, when more runways are built, to have special ones for
General Aviation. With their own aids and entry-exit routes they caln
operate into major terminals safely. Zurich, Switzerland, a busy inter-
national air terminal, has a flying school operation on the airport working
side-by-side with airliners. As an airline pilot, I have never been con-
scious of its presence-the little airplanes have never been the slightest
problem. It is well organized and planned.
C. Crash Survival
The possibility of fire following a survivable crash is one of the airline
pilots' worst nightmares. The awesome size of passenger loads on present
jets and the coming of bigger jets does not make it any better. For example,
a jet transport which never left the ground was involved in an accident.
Relatively minor damage was done to the airplane as it hit an object
while rolling at less than 50 miles per hour. Probably not a person was
injured; many never knew there had been a collision. Yet, 47 people lost
their lives in a horrible holocaust when fuel, which spilled, ignited. This
is the kind of°thing that makes taxiing on airports with construction or
,Wildly driven vehicles a dangerous operation.
Another problem is emergency evacuation methods developed to get
passengers out of airplanes. The record is bad because the chutes do not
do the job. Escape chutes do not work or exits are blocked by fire or dam-
age. Believing that the emergency evacuation equipment and procedures
will do the job is ostrich thinking of the worst kind. The only way to
prevent this problem is to prevent the fire. There are wonderful techno-
logical advances that are more than a dream; they are within our grasp.
Work is being done on inerting, jellied fuels and fuel containment that
[Vol. 34
AIR SAFETY SYMPOSIUM
promises the answer, but work advances slowly. This is a project that
should have tremendous effort-it demands a crash program of the utmost
importance. Certainly the jumbo jets, air buses and SST's should not go
into passenger service until the job is done.
D. Legality
There is a trite but true expression in flying that when a problem can-
not be solved technically it is done by putting another page in the manual
as a procedure or a regulation. This has created a multitude of rules, regu-
lations, and procedures that almost inundate the pilot.
There is a section in the pilot's manual called the "Operations Specifi-
cations." It deals with how the pilot can fly routes, under what conditions
he can make a bad weather approach and so on. These are FAA generated.
In many manuals there are an equal number of pages which attempt to
interpret the FAA rules; they normally add to the confusion.
There are 9 different ways to make an instrument approach to Ken-
nedy Airport, 11 at Chicago, 9 for Los Angeles and more or less the
same for other airports. Each procedure has different rules or conditions.
How these differences are interpreted is often a lengthy discussion in an
office between pilots or the FAA and pilots. In action, however, a pilot
may be flying in bad weather and because of weather or radio aid changes,
may have to make a judgment as to what is legal and what is not in a
few moments. If he errs, there is little compassion; the rule's ambiguities
are no excuse.
It seems that each time there is an accident or incident a new rule is
created to cover the problems, and it is piled on top of rules already in
the books. Most of the rules become a part of the FAA's responsibility
automatically so that an FAA inspector can pick up a pilot for the smallest
infraction with the pilot facing possible federal action.
Pilots do not like to break rules. They do not plan to disobey, but it is
almost impossible not to do so. Couple this with constant surveilance by
FAA and you can see that the pilot sits on a nervous perch. Most lay
people think this is good, but, of course, it detracts from safety. When a
pilot has to make an immediate judgment, it may not be the best judg-
ment because it is tempered by consideration of what may happen to
him if what he thinks is best happens to be illegal. The obscurity of the
rules make a clear-cut picture of what he may and may not do difficult.
There is an area often referred to by pilots as legal blackmail. It begins
with an item in the regulations called "emergency authority." It simply
means that a pilot can break any rule he wants if he thinks it best for
the safety of the flight. This is a platitude the FAA throws over the entire
problem like a net. The trouble with emergency authority is that a pilot
must follow up his action with an explanation, in writing. It is obvious
that he does not want to do this, not because he is afraid to explain his
action, but rather because he is fearful that his explanation will become a
hunting ground for other rules infractions, and it is likely that he will
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wind up having a violation filed against him for something outside the
original reason for his use of emergency authority.
Where is the danger? It is not in the bold action required by a drastic
emergency; any pilot would risk personal exposure to FAA for the sake
of safety. But it is the borderline problem-the time when a situation is
not an emergency but when it may become one-that causes trouble.
The more timid pilot may allow his better judgment to be overshadowed
by the fear of legality. For example, the mandatory noise abatement pro-
cedures fall in this category. There are times, because of wind, turbulence,
and other weather conditions, when it is not a safe operation to follow
those procedures. What happens if the pilot does not comply? He receives
a note from the chief pilot asking for an explanation as to why he made
so much noise. We have now returned to the problem that pilots are
fearful of writing letters. The tendency is for the pilot to fly closer to
the safety edge than his best judgment says he should so that he may
avoid writing a letter and possibly exposing himself to charges.
Pilots are not asking to be relieved of the responsibility of explaining
their actions. What they would like are more realistic rules written for
pilots, not lawyers, and above all, honesty in writing rules and procedures
so that they are possible to comply with and not just ways of covering
a problem. Most pilots, because of this overall rule condition, consider
the FAA a police organization and most FAA inspectors as police officers.
Fear of the FAA is the primary insecurity of most airline pilots. Because
of the rules, regulations, and procedures, the FAA and industry have be-
come basically procedure conscious. They check carefully to see that each
procedure is followed to the letter or number, but unfortunately this does
not always reveal if the pilot being checked is a good or a bad pilot. This
overemphasis on procedures reveals only whether the pilot has a good
memory plus ability to use stick and rudder. It does not tell what judg-
ment he will use under all conditions or how he will combine experience
and knowledge with the mechanical skill of flying. It is the weakness in
today's training and checking. It becomes a serious problem as we expand
quickly and move pilots from novice to copilot to captain at a rapid pace.
The jumble of rules aggravates the problem.
E. The Human Factor
Fatigue, discomfort, difficult working conditions in the context of poor
lighting, heat and ventilation, as well as poorly located controls, all con-
tribute to reducing safety. Pilots are not always clear eyed, rested, and
alert. At sunrise a pilot is sleepy; the sun's rays slam into his eyes, and
poor eye shades do not help. The pilot is dehydrated from the excessive
dryness of a pressurized airplane; his body kinks from the uncomfortable
seat. Below him stretches an endless white cloud blanket. He will soon
enter it and make an approach and landing with a 100 foot ceiling. He
is not in the best condition to make a landing.
Simply stated, not enough consideration is being given to these many
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items which detract from safety. The cockpit of one of the most popular
jet airliners provides an illustration. The pilot's seat does not line up with
the control wheel thus causing the pilot's hands on the wheel to be actually
at one side of his body. There is only a small misalignment, but enough
to shock an orthopedist. The pilot's left arm and shoulder is cold because
of a lack of heat near the window; his right side is too warm. The seat is
uncomfortable with poor padding that has been worn-down from use.
He cannot see important instruments because the control wheel hub hides
them. The instrument lights reflect badly in the windows and reduce his
chances of seeing traffic outside. If he dims the lights enough for outside
vision, the important airspeed indicator is in shadow and difficult to read.
These things are not listed as pilots complaints. They are listed as items
that affect safety.
There is excellent work being done on human factors, but somehow it
does not get into the final design of the cockpit; the man we depend on
for the safety of the flight does not benefit from the work. Also within
the scope of human factors are short landings. These have occured with
alarming regularity. One cause is the pilot's attempt to land short on an
inadequate runway. He wants to get on the ground as soon as possible,
but wind sheer or sensory illusions can result in a premature touch
down. It is useful to dwell on this. In the last 150 feet of descent a pilot
does not have adequate information. The ILS glide slope deteriorates some-
where below this height.
It is practice not to put Visual Glide Slope Indicators on runways
equipped with ILS. The theory is that the ILS guide slope is sufficient.
This concept is in error. The pilot loses radio glide slope as he approaches
the ground. As he comes out of the clouds his attention is necessarily out-
side; he is looking at the runway and not the instruments. At this point,
in the confusion of lights and a rain smeared windshield, he has no glide
slope reference. It is not difficult to get too low. A good visual glide slope
is needed on all runways to help in the final visual part of a bad weather
landing.
This is a typical item in the human factors realm-just one of the items
that make us wonder how many accidents called pilot error should have
been called human factor or system error instead.
III. PILOT SAFETY OUTLOOK
Management, industry, and government sometimes say that pilots ob-
struct air progress in that if it were up to the pilots, no advances would be
made because of their ultra conservatism. This is a fallacious statement.
What the pilots have done, at times, is to prevent a headlong rush moti-
vated more by profit than by safety. Pilots know that progress is necessary.
They are anxious to see it; they have helped make much of it in the past.
But their responsibility for operating aircraft safely must come first.
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